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The Damage from Mega-Sporting 
Events in Brazil
J. Justin Woods
Over the past several years, Brazil’s federal    government and the city and state governments 
of Rio de Janeiro have invested tens of billions of 
dollars to develop the transportation, stadium, tourist, 
communications and security infrastructure required 
to host the 2007 Pan American Games, 2014 World 
Cup, and 2016 Summer Olympics. As Brazil seeks to 
use these mega- sporting events to assert itself as a 
major economic player on the word stage, its strategy 
demonstrates how hosting mega-events serves to attract 
regional and global capital, and to reinforce unequal 
power structures at the expense of the public treasury, 
environmental quality and social equity.
The competition to host international and mega-sport-
ing events has been particularly fierce among the so-
called BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, 
and South Africa), who are seeking to demonstrate to 
global capitalists that their countries have the physical, 
legal and regulatory infrastructure necessary to accom-
modate large-scale capital investment. The US Justice 
Department’s recent indictment of soccer officials and 
marketing executives associated with FIFA (Fédération 
Internationale de Football Association), which owns the 
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World Cup, brings renewed attention to the corrupt 
and exploitive relationships between international 
sporting organizations, global corporations, finance 
capital, real estate and economic development. 
While cities and countries seek to host mega-events 
for a variety of economic and geopolitical reasons, 
independent economic and social science research 
has repeatedly demonstrated the promises of local 
economic development benefits do not justify such 
massive public expenditures and debt. As Andrew 
Zimbalist notes in the book Circus Maximus, except 
for the Summer Olympics in Los Angeles (1984) and 
Barcelona (1992), virtually every municipality that has 
hosted the Olympics or World Cup over the last sev-
eral decades has been saddled with a combination of 
significant debt, “white elephant” stadiums, and a leg-
acy of environmental degradation and social problems 
related to displacement, sprawl, and gentrification. 
Neoliberal Economic Model: Public Financing and Private 
Profit
Based on the perceived success of the 2007 Pan 
American Games, hosted by Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 
was awarded the 2014 World Cup and Rio de Janeiro 
the 2016 Summer Olympics. This afforded Brazil an 
opportunity to leverage its investments and address 
much needed physical and social infrastructure 
such as housing and mass transit. Instead, however, 
the Brazilian case provides more evidence that 
mega-sporting events adhere to an unsustainable 
neoliberal economic policy that transforms public 
debt into wealth for global and regional elites at 
the expense of local needs and well-being. 
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The Maracanã Stadium, 
built for the 1950 World 
Cup, underwent a $200 
million renovation for 
the Pan American Games, 
and was then partially 
demolished and rebuilt for 
another $500 million . . . 
for the 2014 World Cup. 
After nearly $1 billion 
dollars in publicly funded 
renovations that reduced 
general admissions 
standing capacity by 
adding seats and exclusive 
VIP/luxury boxes, a private 
construction company now 
has a 35-year contract to 
manage the stadium.  
•
For the 2007 Pan American Games, the city, state 
and federal governments in Brazil spent over $10 
billion on stadium construction and renovation and 
transportation and communications infrastructure, 
making Rio the host of the costliest Pan American 
Games ever. Extensive transportation and environ-
mental improvements initially called for a new subway 
line and to clean up the polluted Guanabara Bay. Yet, 
as corruption, waste and delays resulted in costs ex-
ceeding five times the budgeted amounts, these public 
benefit projects were scrapped and left incomplete.
The Maracanã Stadium, originally built for the 1950 
World Cup, illustrates the effect of 
these policies. The Maracanã under-
went a $200 million renovation for the 
Pan American Games, and was then 
partially demolished and rebuilt for 
another $500 million to meet FIFA’s 
requirements for the 2014 World Cup. 
After nearly $1 billion dollars in pub-
licly funded renovations that reduced 
general admissions standing capacity 
by adding seats and exclusive VIP/
luxury boxes, a private construction 
company now has a 35-year contract 
to manage the stadium. 
In total, Brazil committed to remod-
eling or constructing 12 stadiums na-
tionwide to host the 2014 World Cup 
at a projected budget of $1.1 billion. 
However, the stadium budget rose to 
over $4.7 billion. Nine of the twelve 
stadiums were brand new, and seven 
of those were built on sites at which 
existing stadiums were demolished. All 
of the stadiums were publicly financed, 
and, with the exception of two stadiums 
that are still looking for private managers, the other ten 
are all under long-term private management contracts. 
The public treasury bears the costs of debt service and 
maintenance for these projects, while private manage-
ment companies gain the usufruct rights. Further, the 
capacity of the remaining stadiums far exceeds the 
communities’ needs after the short-lived mega-events. 
These “white elephants” stadiums are a common 
problem for past mega-event hosts and Brazil appears 
headed for a similar fate. Four of the World Cup sta-
diums in Brazil were constructed in cities without 
premier soccer teams. Second division teams typically 
draw an attendance of about 1,500 people, but now 
these communities have 40,000 plus capacity stadi-
ums that have millions of dollars in annual mainte-
nance and operating costs, on top of the debt service 
for stadiums that cost an average of $325 million. 
Similarly the Centro Acuático Maria Lenk, which was 
the main center for swimming events during the 2007 
Pan American Games, has not hosted an event since 
the games. Not only does it remain 
unused and closed to the public, but it 
will also require significant renovations 
to meet IOC requirements for the 
2016 Olympics. And because the pool 
does not meet the Olympic standards 
for all events, an additional swim-
ming center is being constructed for 
the Olympics. The focus on building 
short-term sporting facilities disas-
sociated from community needs pre- 
and post-events is a wasteful practice 
that, if curtailed, could redirect scarce 
resources towards projects that bet-
ter align with both the events and 
the communities’ long-term needs.
Environmental Consequences
In addition to saddling Brazil with 
white elephant infrastructure and 
decades of debt, the skewed pri-
orities of mega-events have enor-
mous environmental consequences. 
As part of the 2007 Pan American 
Games, new venues were built throughout the city, 
including the “Villa Pan” (Olympic housing) on 
greenfield sites and a golf course on state park land 
in Barra de Tijuca, which is located near a wealthy 
area of the city far removed from public transit. 
The original Brazil Olympic Plan, modeled after the 
Barcelona plan, was designed to include four clusters of 
development connected by new public transit infrastruc-
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ture. However, rather than reinforce a city revitalization 
plan that ties together the urban fabric, Rio’s plan facil-
itates sprawl and socio-economic segregation. Further, 
by abandoning the improvements to the subway and 
mass transit system, the Rio Olympics will have a large 
carbon footprint as most transportation will be by cars 
and buses. The combined effect of failing to extend the 
subway and displacing thousands of residents further 
from their jobs will exacerbate carbon intensive land use 
patterns and sprawl.
Another land use issue associated with significant envi-
ronmental problems is the construction of an Olympic 
golf course on environmentally fragile and protected 
public lands in part of Brazil’s Atlantic Rain Forest in 
Barra da Tijuca. This provides more evidence of the so-
called “law exclusion zones” surrounding mega-events. 
Despite massive objections, the conversion of federally 
protected public land is being made to a private recre-
ational facility without complying with the environmen-
tal impact requirements in Brazil’s Federal Constitution. 
Lastly, as noted previously, the City of Rio de Janeiro 
promised to clean up the Bay of Guanabara for the 
2007 Pan American Games, and it committed to fur-
ther cleanups to host the Olympics. Guanabara Bay is 
scheduled to be the site of Olympic sailing and wind-
surfing events, but the bay is saddled with large floating 
garbage and debris, and the raw sewage often smells so 
bad that reportedly it can be tasted. Not only has the 
cleanup yet to be completed, but in January Rio’s state 
environment secretary, Andre Correa, admitted that nei-
ther the city nor state government can remove at least 
80% of pollutants in time for the Olympics as promised. 
Displacement and the Right to Housing
Private wealth, finance and real estate interests have also 
mobilized the Brazilian government to deprive economi-
cally marginalized people of basic constitutional and hu-
man rights, such as housing, by converting public and 
quasi-public spaces and resources to private use without 
adhering to legal procedures. Human displacement, the 
disruption of established communities and the lost op-
portunity to use billions of dollars in investments to ad-
dress needed societal problems represent the true social 
legacies associated with Brazil’s mega-sporting events.
Mega-sporting events in Brazil have displaced poor 
residents in the name of beautification projects 
that attract global capital and tourists. Such forced 
relocations are not unique to Brazil, and have 
accompanied numerous US mega-projects, such as 
massive slum clearances to facilitate urban renewal 
and the siting of sport stadiums, government 
complexes and transportation infrastructure. However, 
the scope and violent manner in which Brazilians 
have been forcibly removed from their favelas, in 
many cases without due process or compensation, 
has been so extreme as to cause violent protests 
leading up to and during the World Cup.
The Federal Constitution of 1988 recognizes housing 
as a fundamental right, and Brazil’s landmark 2001 City 
Statute codifies the social use of buildings and land as a 
public policy goal. Unfortunately, however, substantive 
and procedural constitutional and human rights have 
been easily discarded to clear slums for athletic housing, 
hotels and other communication, transportation, and 
sporting infrastructure. Despite promises to convert 
Olympic villages into desperately needed housing for 
the poor, numerous case studies in Brazil (and else-
where, including London and Atlanta) show that the 
investments typically finance luxury housing. The rise 
in housing and real estate prices economically displaces 
many more of the poor residents that were not forci-
bly removed by the initial slum clearance programs.
Official government policy in Brazil is that relocated 
residents will be given adequate notice and then 
moved to new places and compensated. However, 
numerous press reports and civil rights investiga-
tors dispute these accounts, with residents reporting 
being forcibly evicted by armed police, without no-
tice or compensation. And the “fortunate” ones that 
are relocated often report receiving less comparable 
housing at locations far removed from their com-
munities, families, jobs and public transportation. 
Assessing the Damage
Brazil’s case demonstrates that using mega-events 
as a revitalization strategy comes at the expense of 
massive debt and wealth transfer from the public 
sector to the private. 
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Further, the environmental consequences of hosting 
mega-events facilitates poor land use, impacts 
environmentally sensitive areas and fails to deliver 
environmental benefits such as improved mass transit 
or pollution remediation. In Brazil, the government’s 
skewed investment priorities represent lost opportunities 
to improve the environment by protecting critical 
environmental areas, improving urban sanitary 
sewer systems and reducing its carbon footprint 
by improving mass transit and limiting sprawl.
As with previous hosts, Brazil’s mega-sporting events 
offer a pretext for domestic and international elites to 
fast-track highly profitable projects by circumventing 
normal regulatory processes and human rights pro-
tections. In the rush to deliver promised infrastructure 
and policy reforms to “modernize their cities,” favelas 
are torn down, displacing thousands of people to facil-
itate powerful real estate and capital interests. Planners 
should be skeptical of the benefits promised from host-
ing mega-events, especially for developing countries. 
The massive costs required would be better invested in 
housing, mass transit and environmental protection for 
its residents, rather than to benefit elite investors.  P2
